Gender and Planning
A Reader

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We dedicate this book to those
who have come before us,
and through their work,
have made our own paths easier.

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Feminism and Planning

Theoretical Issues

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Planning as it is practiced today has its roots in European and American reform movements of the latter part of the nineteenth century. Although the dominant approach varied from country to country, all shared a reaction to the squalor of the industrial metropolis. Efforts to deal with lack of sanitation, traffic congestion, slum housing and the laying out of peripheral districts involved the imposition of physical orderliness in counterpoint to the perceived chaos of the existing city. The architect and the engineer, standing at their drawing boards, developed the template on which the city transformed and grew. Numerous commentators have remarked on the upper-class basis of the planning movement, which sought to impose its environmental-determinist biases on citizens whose situation resulted primarily from poverty and economic transformation, not their physical surroundings (see Foglesong 1986; Gans 1968; Hall 1996). Feminist scholars have commented on its exclusion of women as subjects, its isolation of women as objects, and its deployment of a scientific rationalism that precluded a logic based in sentiment, nurturance, and obligation (Cott 1987; Hirschman 1989; Sandercock and Forsyth 1992; Wilson 1991). In this chapter I discuss the elements of planning that were susceptible to attack by feminists, the components of the feminist critique, and the difficulties raised by this critique for feminism and for planning. In particular, I raise the concern that an overemphasis on difference can undermine the progressive egalitarian aims that originally inspired feminist thinkers. Finally, I consider what would constitute feminist planning and fit this concept into a broader discussion of the elements of the just city.

Historical Origins of Feminist Concerns

Arising from a nineteenth-century vision of women's place, early Anglo-American planning responded to fears of female emancipation. In suburban England and somewhat later in the United States, migrants from the city moved to planned suburbs, envisioning a "bourgeois utopia" where women would not be exposed to temptation and could devote themselves to household and children without the distractions of urban life (Fishman 1987). The American assault on the apartment or "French flat" decried the freedom it provided women, both to escape the demands of housework and to roam the streets of the city (Wright 1981). The dream of the domestic nuclear family—far away from the congested city streets, safely contained within its idealized cottage, children happily playing in the garden under mother's watchful eyes—made up a substantial part of the "feminine mystique" (Friedan 1963).

Planners in continental Europe, on the other hand, escaped the prudery afflicting their English-speaking counterparts. The widely imitated transformation of Paris by Baron Haussmann did not aim at stamping out vice but rather at modernizing and expanding the city's form (Berman 1988, Harvey 1985). The huge public investment in urban improvement and the accompanying property speculation during the regime of Napoleon III stimulated the development of a conspicuously luxurious lifestyle wherein the city itself became the basis for extensive commodification and an often-open sexuality. Within the bourgeoisie this expressed itself in opulent consumption by ladies enjoying the growing wealth of their class. The privation of the seamstresses and shop girls catering to this exploding consumption of luxury goods passed unnoticed beneath the spectacle (Debord 1990). Indeed the currently lamented use of the "city as theme park" (Sorkin 1992) began in nineteenth-century Paris, even if that place and period are now nostalgically recalled as the golden age of the (male) flâneur by contemporary critics of commodification. Moreover, then as now the city as spectacle was afflicted by dualism: while bourgeois ladies and gentlemen were enjoying the glittering restaurants and beautified parks, desperation forced millions of women into prostitution, and working-class men suffered the privations of factory life.[1]

Despite differences in the locational outcomes of continental and Anglo-American planning efforts, in general planning throughout the western world sought to impose a rationality at odds with a sentimental view of human relations. First based in a purely physical conception of city development and then, after World War II, the application of social science methods, the male-dominated profession of city planning used criteria of order and efficiency to determine appropriate forms of spatial disposition. Building on a contractual conception of human freedom and legitimacy, planning, like political thought more broadly, did not consider the particular needs of women. It was assumed that women would bear principal responsibility for maintaining the household and raising children; household affairs were largely considered private matters, inappropriate for public oversight, especially as concerned instances of domestic violence. Governmental authorities did, however, take onto themselves the supervision of

sanitary and child rearing practices among the lower classes, with the aim of enforcing morality and insuring the reproduction of the labor force (Donzelot 1979).

Planning has been guided by abstract norms of fairness, individual rights, and proper behavior and by an analysis of social action as derived from self-interest: "For traditional morality, increasingly recognizable as developed from a male point of view, there seems to be either the pure principle of the rational lawgiver or the self-interest of the individual contractor. There is the unreal universality of *all*, or the real *self of* individual interest. Both views, however, lose sight of acting *for* particular others in actual contexts" (Held 1990, 301; italics in original).

Thus, planning, beyond the enforcement of traditional morality, did not deal with the consequences of dependency and obligation that fell to women's lot (as will be discussed in more detail later).[2] Furthermore, in its application of the efficiency criterion to the city, it promoted that urban form which most contributed to aggregate wealth rather than to equitable outcomes. Later, in the same rationalistic tradition, planners used models to predict travel and settlement patterns and develop plans for the most efficient spatial arrangement; in doing so, they assumed household behavior and location derived from the journey-to-work choices of the man in the house and took as natural the household division of labor (Benería 2003, chapter 2; Borja and Castells 1997; Markusen 1981).

Still, planning as a profession and as an academic discipline has always had running through it a moral current that differentiates it from economics and demands a greater responsiveness to deprivation (Bratt forthcoming). Nineteenth-century movements calling for tenement reform, achievement of Ebenezer Howard's early utopian vision of the garden city, and the development of settlement houses all aimed at mitigating the damage of capitalism and had as their underlying ethic the creation of the good rather than the efficient city. Forming part of the reform coalitions of their times, these movements influenced official planning directly and indirectly, although also losing their radicalism as they became absorbed into the mainstream.[3] Thus, even while business interests were pressing for improved transportation systems and homeowners were concerned with maintaining property values, other elements of the planning movement were exposing the desperate living conditions of the poor, stimulating popular outrage and prompting demands for regulation and public construction. Moreover, against the twentieth-century backdrop of the rise of socialist parties in Western Europe, the Great Depression, post–World War II devastation, and the threat of Soviet-exported communism, reform measures appealed even to conservative legislators as a sensible method of countering potentially revolutionary tendencies (Foglesong 1986).[4]

Planning then, despite its upper-class bias and preoccupation with order, offered niches for those with a social conscience. Women were particularly prominent in the more socially responsive efforts, being active in the settlement

house movement as well as among those calling for improved housing for the poor. Social work and planning, however, although originally together in common organizations and conferences, split apart, with governmental agencies focused either on social issues or bricks and mortar. Women remained notable as proponents of government-sponsored housing, but in the United States a second split, within planning itself, caused housing policy to be largely separate from land-use planning and urban renewal, despite repeated legislative efforts to coordinate planning, urban redevelopment, and social programs.

Moreover, reform, even when promoted by women, took for granted many of the assumptions underlying mainstream planning in regard to gender. Only with the rise of the second wave of feminism in the 1970s did the progressive forces in planning go beyond concerns with inequities produced by class and race to condemn disadvantage resulting from gender. Their critique constituted part of a larger feminist attack not just on inequitable public policy but on the very epistemology and moral universe that underlay planning. For the principal justification of planning had always been rationality, but now rationality was being assaulted from the left as a legitimation of privilege and as part of a way of thinking that imposed an unfeeling, male view of the world (Beauregard 2003; Milroy 1992). Whereas until then the public interest had provided the broadly accepted governing criterion for planning (AICP 1981), postmodernist deconstructionists regarded it as a term that obfuscated the real (white, male, capitalist, western) interests that it defended while purporting to represent all.

Planning, the Public Interest, and its Meaning for Women

Although the public interest has provided the enduring justification for the activities of planners, the definition of this slippery term has varied according to the underlying value orientation of its user (Fainstein and Fainstein 1971, 1996). On the whole, most planners and planning theorists in democratic societies implicitly or explicitly have accepted an amalgam of Lockean and Rousseauian conceptions of the public interest. The Lockean tradition values individualism, the primacy of private interests, the rights of property owners, and public decision making based on representative *government* (Hartz 1955). At the same time, the very basis of planning rests on a faith in the virtues of coordination and accepts that what Rousseau called "the will of all"—defined as people acting in their narrowly conceived self-interest—often does not produce the "general will," that is, what people would want if they perceived what benefited them as a collectivity (Rousseau 1994). There has always been ambiguity in terms of how to divine the public interest. The commitment to democracy leads to calls for citizen participation; the belief in a transcendent public good implies a reliance on experts who may override both the market and popular taste to produce an outcome for long-term social betterment.[5] The tension between markets, democracy, and expertise

runs throughout the history of planning (Fischer 2000). Until recently, however, both interpretations of the public interest (public will and objectively determined good) took for granted the unitary quality of the public interest and the universality of criteria for determining it (Davidoff 1965).[6]

Universality of criteria constituted one facet of planning to which feminists objected, as will be described later. Initially, planning at the drawing board elevated design over social concerns and promoted good design as beneficial to all, even if it resulted in the destruction of the property or domiciles of some. Later social science methodologies based on positivist analysis excluded considerations rooted in moral and group logics and were typically used to justify planning decisions that negatively affected politically weak groups as being in the public interest. In particular, the use of cost-benefit analysis that produced one favored outcome, reliance on quantitative indicators, and the application of hypothesis testing and regression analysis to planning issues all subordinated subjective feelings to measurable attributes. Further, they substituted a mechanical process (the rational model) for the evaluation of substantive results and of how those substantive results affected the most vulnerable groups in the population (Sandercock and Forsyth 1992; chapter 4).

Nevertheless, even during the heyday of the rational model in the 1960s and 1970s, an important dissenting stream castigated planning for its callousness in the face of human suffering (Abrams 1965; Davidoff 1965; Gans 1968) and its blindness to the merits of diversity (Jacobs 1961). Planning did not have the luxury possessed by the more academic social science disciplines of insulating itself from action, and as the urban renewal bulldozers rolled over people's neighborhoods, protests in the streets ensued, often directed at planners (Fainstein and Fainstein 1974). The critics of the 1960s and 1970s accused planners of obliviousness to the hardships of those standing in the path of urban renewal or excluded from suburban housing. Like earlier advocates of more egalitarian planning approaches, they also neglected the particular interests of women. But, in introducing the concepts of pluralism and diversity in planning, they laid the groundwork for the later feminist, postmodernist attack.

The Feminist Critique

The feminist critique contains both a set of specific charges and an overarching theoretical argument. In terms of specifics, the critique points to an exclusionary decision-making process, the cultural norms and analytic methods that devalued women's work, the failure of municipal governments to provide adequate services to women, and obliviousness to the feminization of poverty.

Specific Issues

DECISION MAKING. Feminists contend that, until recently, women were excluded from decision making relevant to the formation of the built environ-

ment. Male developers have dominated the real estate sector (Fainstein 2001), constructing trophy buildings in city centers and designing suburbia according to their views of appropriate family living (Hayden 2002; Wright 1981). Planning boards and agencies, while less exclusively male than property firms, likewise have been predominantly masculine. This lack of female representation inevitably weakened female influence on planning outcomes. Thus, Jacqueline Leavitt (1981, 226) argued that "the structure of planning, usually organized around functional and geographic areas, does not encourage analyzing clients' needs, working with constituents, or integrating a feminist analysis." Since the time in which she made her accusation, women unquestionably have played a greater role in planning organizations and the norms of such bodies have changed to emphasize working with the public. Nevertheless, the great majority of agency directors remain male, and this is especially true of the economic development agencies that have become the most important planning arms within British and American cities.

The powerlessness of women contributed to the insensitivity of planning in regard to their requirements for daycare, transit, and community support. The inadequacy of suburban development in meeting female needs and the isolation of housewives in suburban homes were the target of considerable feminist opprobrium. Saegert (1981) interestingly found that men expressed much greater satisfaction with the suburban manse than women, even though many claimed that it was developed in response to the wishes of women. For men, returning to suburban quietude after a day's work afforded them a haven in a heartless world (Lasch 1979; Zaretsky 1976), while for women suburban residence denied access to better jobs and the company of other adults.

CULTURAL NORMS. The lack of participation of women in planning and development decisions, however, was less important in determining how urban development affected women than was a general mindset, shared by men and women alike. Captured by Betty Friedan (1963) in her description of the feminine mystique, this understanding of the world construed women's identity as deriving from home, children, and consumption. Even in Western Europe, where state provision of support services was much more widely accepted than in the United States (Esping-Anderson 1990; Kahn and Kamerman 1975), the view that women should stay home with the children or at most work part-time largely prevailed up to the 1980s.[7]

Ann Markusen (1981, 25; chapter 10), when examining how this mindset plays itself out in economic analysis, asserts:

The labor power of women within a capitalist system is employed partially or wholly in the service of men in the household and … the returns to both women's and men's labor are contained in the family wage, which the man

controls. Women's work involves the same basic activities that occur in capitalist production, but organized differently. A woman produces a meal for the household by purchasing raw material inputs at the grocery store or by growing a garden, combining them with her labor, time, energy, and machine power provided by kitchen equipment, and serving them to household members. In contrast her hired counterpart in the restaurant may do the same things, but her service is sold for a price. . . . The production and efficiency of household production in the former case are just as important as in the latter.

But, even though women's labor in the home is essential to the reproduction of labor power, it is not priced and thus has no value within economic analysis.[8] Consequently, "few treatments of optimal household location in urban space try to account for the maximization of efficiency in household production" (Markusen 1981, 25). The mentality that undervalues women's labor thus embeds itself in seemingly objective economic calculation. Although cost-benefit analysis could conceivably attribute value to women's time, as is sometimes done for other benefits not exchanged in a market, doing so would create immense methodological difficulties and is, to my knowledge, never attempted.

SUPPORT SERVICES. In the United States, despite the lack of daycare, poor public transit, and sprawled development, female labor force participation actually exceeded that in European countries throughout the last part of the twentieth century (Borja and Castells 1997). Nevertheless, public transit that would enable women to free themselves from chauffeuring children, daycare that would permit them to work, clustering of housing so that they could share chores with their neighbors were all contrary to the dominant ideal. The siting of public services was done with little regard for the location of their likely users. During the 1970s, when women began to assert their right to independence and demand daycare and school lunches, other women who had committed themselves to being stay-at-home moms loudly opposed them (and indeed such divisions among women continue today but less vociferously). Thus, the norms prescribing the form of the desirable community changed little until the decade of the 1990s, which saw the rise of the new urbanism and the gentrification of city centers. Rather, they remained firmly placed in a suburban mentality protective of large lots and segregation of uses, and even today that outlook remains dominant in the U.S., embedded throughout the country in countless suburban zoning ordinances and in the biases of planning boards.

FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY. Planners concerned with inner city redevelopment and combating poverty tended to overlook the fact that women with children constituted the great majority of the poor (Leavitt and Saegert 1990). Public con-

cern with low-income areas sprang from a fear of unruly male adolescents, and dealing with their threat was central to the programs developed for the inner city.[9] In the discussions of the urban underclass that prevailed during the 1990s in the U.S. and of immigrant communities that were its European counterparts, young men were the focus of attention.[10] The book that stimulated this discussion, William Julius Wilson's The Truly Disadvantaged (1987), traced the problems of the ghetto poor to the lack of jobs for men; the difficulties of women were attributed not to their low earnings but to the paucity of marriageable men. Ironically, given the hardships that it has inflicted on women being forced off the welfare rolls, the U.S.'s Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 ("welfare reform") finally forced government agencies to place priority on women's jobs.

Even though cultural norms regarding women's equality were no more advanced in Europe than in the U.S.—in fact, arguably less so in many countries—the institutions of the welfare state and the planning traditions of European cities were more hospitable to women. Family allowances, daycare provision, and paid maternity leave were supportive of women's maternal roles even if male partners were not willing to assist in household chores. Denser urban aggregations and better public transit systems supported women's daytime, non-work-related trips. Changing demographics, however, have created challenges for European welfare systems, as the number of single-earner female households has dramatically increased, resulting in greater service needs and the inadequacy of conceptualizing a family wage in terms of a male breadwinner. In both the U.S. and Europe, recent pressure to consider household members as individuals rather than parts of a single unit has required a recalibration of benefit systems, most significantly in relation to old-age pensions.

SUMMARY OF PRACTICAL CRITICISM. In general, the attacks on policy analysis and public programs within planning paralleled those in other professional disciplines (law, medicine, social work, etc.). The overall thrust was that the top people in the field were men; the particular needs and interests of women had been ignored; policy research usually scrutinized men only (in medicine the typical drug test only used male subjects). With some exceptions, especially the landmark issue of Signs published in 1980,[11] the discussion tended to be atheoretical and to point to clearly desirable but fairly obvious policy conclusions, essentially boiling down to the inclusion of women in decision making and in the substance of policy. Not far beneath the surface, however, lay what is the principal theoretical divide within feminism—whether or not there is a distinctively feminine mode of thinking ("a different voice") that is inherently different from that of males.[12]

Theoretical Issues

Feminist theorists have attempted to go beyond the scrutiny of social relations according to Enlightenment values of fairness and rationality and to propose criteria that transcend western dualisms like freedom and authority, public and private. They have contended that feminine thought processes[13] differ from masculine ones, involving a more empathetic, less Cartesian understanding of right and wrong. In addition, feminism has employed a methodological eclecticism reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of women's studies as well as a frequent rejection of the positivism of modern social science. Thus, feminist theorists have substituted psychoanalytic insights and cultural critique for quantitative analysis or Marxist dialectics; and they have employed openly subjectivist narratives ("telling stories") and visual media in place of the standard "scientific" exposition.

Substantively feminist social theory has redefined concepts of freedom and justice. The work of Nancy Chodorow (1978), for instance, emphasizes the different outcomes of the oedipal crisis for boys and girls, resulting in masculine valorization of separation and feminine yearning for attachment. Thus, the high priority placed on liberty rather than connectedness reflects a masculine outlook rooted in early childhood. In a parallel formulation, Carol Gilligan's male subjects sought fairness through a rational calculus, while her female ones argued empathetically; boys valued abstract justice, while girls stressed relationships (Gilligan 1982). These "female values" of closeness and empathy contravene the classic, Lockean definition of freedom as "freedom from," based as it is on acceptance of separation as a desirable state.

Hirschmann, in an effort to develop a feminist theory of obligation, builds on these arguments: "[Within the Enlightenment tradition] the necessity of consent to obligation must logically derive from the freedom of individuals and from the concept of freedom defined negatively" (1989, 1234). "[But] women have been bound historically to an entire series of other obligations—child care most obviously—to which consent is not only often unavailable but often of questionable relevance. Are these 'obligations' entirely invalid? Or do they suggest a need to redefine the concept of obligation itself?" (ibid., 1240).

An extension of these arguments to planning calls into question the rationales for most planning decisions. Feminism implies intuitive, participatory approaches to gaining knowledge and nonrational (although not necessarily irrational) contextual solutions to planning problems. Forecasts of the impacts of public capital investments rely on economic analyses that have no place for sentiment, empathy, and personal relationships—by placing a monetary value on natural resources, human life, and human time, they devalue outcomes that cannot be calibrated in financial terms.[14] Lourdes Benaria (2003, 43) comments that "[this] emphasis obfuscated the interrelationship between the identification of economists have made choice "the focus of mainstream analysis," in contrast to a

feminist approach "with an emphasis on provisioning for individual and collective well-being as the central alternative objective of economics."

Land-use planning decisions in the United States are normally made by planning commissions operating within a quasi-judicial framework. The typical planning hearing involves advocates of a development and their opponents expressing their differing points of view rather than seeking common ground, resulting in a zero-sum game and the perpetuation of antagonism instead of a consensual outcome benefiting everyone. Thus, the system regulating land use is rooted in an adversarial concept of opposing parties that forges the connections between people posited by feminists. Feminist theory, in contrast, introduces a perspective that starts with concepts of communal relations and incommensurable values, substitutes the development of consensus for adversarial approaches, protects the weak, and recognizes the importance of emotional bonds.

This approach has generally found a niche in the move in planning theory that labels itself communicative rationality (Forester 1999; Healey 1996, 1997; Innes 1995). Extending beyond feminism to the acceptance of "difference" more generally, this branch of planning theory exhorts planners to "listen" to others, so as to achieve a more just and inclusive society. Communicative rationality seems to offer the possibility of a more humane planning practice than heretofore. It also, however, contains blindnesses that can lead to unproductive dead ends (Fainstein 2000). Indeed, feminist planning, if it accepts too uncritically the postmodernist critique and communicative solution, can easily lose sight of the progressive ends that inspired feminism at the start.

Weaknesses of Feminist Planning Theory

The postmodernist attack on the Enlightenment rejects rationalism as producing a totalizing discourse that is insensitive to difference and therefore exclusionary. This renunciation of rationalism, along with an emphasis on connection and natural obligation, can have a strong conservative tendency. It may lead to an outlook upholding conservative views that promote unregulated market processes and biologically determined roles for women. Jane Jacobs, whose governing principle in *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961) was diversity, has become a darling of conservative market economists because she sees productivity as resulting from limits on regulation.[15] She excoriates planning for producing monotony and dampening creativity but does not consider that planning's absence weakens any possibility of social melioration through conscious collective action.

Feminist scholars have challenged Enlightenment thought for dichotomizing concepts (for example, public v. private, city v. suburb). The argument is that "male with workplace/public/city and female with home, private, and suburb"

(Ellin 1996, 51). Yet, feminist discourse tends toward similar dualisms—in particular, feminine/anarchic/sensual versus masculine/rigid/objective. Indeed, as one critic of postmodernists' assault on polarities comments: "positing difference against identity succeeds only in falling back within the very logic of binary opposition their deconstructive enterprise tries to resist" (Norcross 1997, 136).

Carol Gilligan's (1982) famous argument that girls/women speak in a different voice from boys/men, that they have different moral pantheons, equates female with intuition, feeling, and empathy and male with logic, orderliness, and fairness. Elizabeth Wilson (1991) argues that rationalist planning has been imposed on the city to protect men from the threat of disorderly, anarchic femininity, thereby setting up an antinomy between order and disorder. She equates these polarities with sexual differences. The implication of these dualisms is an identification of the feminine with the irrational and points to an essential feminine character opposed to ideals of order and efficiency. These authors, however, do not explain why order and efficiency should not be desired. They seem to be saying that as values they inevitably privilege the male, but it is not clear why this should be so. Even if they can be used to repress difference or justify inequity, they need not be used that way, and women as well as men benefit from efficiently operating systems.

Repudiation of objectivity as unattainable and therefore nothing but a mask for underlying bias sacrifices the principal rhetorical basis on which the battle for equality has been fought. In the past opponents of equality, based in traditional bastions of authority, claimed legitimacy based on organic conceptions of a society connected by natural bonds. The thrust toward resistance to oppression and efforts at progressive social transformation in the western world arose out of a rationalist logic that compared what is to an abstract formulation of what should be. From Kant to Marx to Rawls the demand for equal treatment has been based on argumentation that proceeded from establishing premises to deducing consequences. Abandoning deductive logic on the grounds that it has failed to produce equity for women supports a subjectivity capable of doing considerable harm rather than an empathy likely to cause ethical treatment. Fairness may be a cold concept, but we should be wary of abandoning it in favor of empathy.[16]

An approach that begins simply with sensibility elicits agreement only from those who share similar responses. Communicative planning theory seeks to overcome this hurdle by according legitimacy to all standpoints through discussion, reintroducing reason if not formal rationality, and aiming toward consensus. Thus, Healey argues that planners, acting as mediators, can elicit "mutual understanding" from groups with initially different interests and values:

Any recourse to scientific knowledge or rational procedures must now be contained within some other conception of what makes for democratic "acting in the world." Habermas offers an alternative that retains the

notion of the liberating and democratic potential of reasoning, but broadened to encompass not merely rational-technical forms of reasoning but moral appreciation and aesthetic experience. This wider understanding of what we know and how we know it, rooted as much in "practical sense" as in formalized knowledge, is brought into collective "deciding and acting" though intersubjective communication rather than the self-reflective consciousness of autonomous individuals. The effort of constructing mutual understanding as the locus of reasoning activity replaces the subject-centered "philosophy of consciousness" that . . . has dominated Western conceptions of reason since the Enlightenment. . . . *This shifts attention from the substantive purposes of . . . planning to the practices by which purposes are established, actions identified, and followed through.* (Healey 1996, 245–246, italics added)

The problem with this approach is not its broader construction of reason than that employed by positivist methodologies nor its emphasis on persuasion. Rather it arises from its pure emphasis on process rather than outcome, its assumption that false consciousness and power differentials can be readily overcome,[17] and its refusal to establish principles of just outcomes. Communicative planning works well when there are common interests and shared goals but disagreement over means to reach those ends. Even then, it raises questions if the shared goals are contrary to norms of justice. Unless all stakeholders participate in the discussion, consensus on NIMBYism is easily achieved. But how does one include potential in-movers in discussions among members of planning boards? And if they are included, and their social characteristics differ significantly from those of the existing community, is consensus possible?

The Just City

Several feminist philosophers have offered a different approach that avoids some of the traps of postmodernism. They have done so by retaining the principle of justice but attempting to define it so as to incorporate the idea of difference and to talk about ends as well as means, outcomes as well as processes.

The principle of justice has a long history in philosophy. It is a universalistic concept, rooted in eastern and western religious dicta concerning appropriate action and in Enlightenment concepts of natural law. Its contemporary explication is based in the ongoing debate surrounding John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* (1971). Feminist philosophers have attacked Rawls for not recognizing gender/sexual differences of individuals in the "original position" and thus assuming that any rational individual would make the same choices behind a veil of ignorance. Thus, it is argued that without stipulating so, Rawls regards that individual's characteristics as male (Pateman 1988, 43), and he defines justice purely in terms of

fairness in the distribution of material goods (Nussbaum 2000, chapter 1; Young 1990, 16).

Both Young and Nussbaum object to this materiality and argue for a more flexible, contingent conception of justice embodying both deliberative democracy (Young 2000) and specific ends:

Rawls's approach ... has some serious difficulties. By measuring who is better off and who worse off in terms of resources, the Rawlsian model neglects a salient fact of life: that individuals vary greatly in their needs for resources and in their abilities to convert resources into valuable functionings. ... The shortcomings of both the utilitarian and the resource-based approaches suggest that we will take a stand in the most appropriate way if we focus not on satisfaction or the mere presence of resources, but on what individuals are actually able to do and to be. (Nussbaum 2000, 68, 69)

Nussbaum proceeds to list the capabilities needed for human self-realization, while retaining, more than Iris Marion Young, a continued focus on material resources. The capabilities she describes range from bodily integrity and sensuality to political participation to material resources (ibid., 78–80). Nussbaum recognizes differences among persons, the requirement of a potential for political participation, and also a fair distribution of material goods (which may not be an equal one). She derives these capabilities, however, from a "defense of universal values" rather than an attack on universalism that accuses it of obscuring difference. She worries that an emphasis on "difference" leads too easily to a moral relativism and inquires "Why should we follow the local ideas, rather than the best ideas we can find?" (ibid., 49). She further contends that these "best" ideas do not simply represent the dicta of white, European males and considers the possibility that oppressed women may have a false consciousness that obscures their knowledge of their own interests. Thus, unless the capabilities she lists—which include "adequate education" and being able to engage in critical reflection—can be realized in combination, recognition of difference alone can result in the willing embrace of unjust principles.

When considering the issue of what constitutes the just city, then, one must envision a locale that allows diversity within a general framework of universal principles. In previous work I cited Amsterdam as a metropolis that embodies such a combination (Fainstein 1997, 1999). There are active public spaces, relative material equality, neighborhood political participation, a strong planning regime, and high levels of social capital despite some degree of ethnic segregation (Musterd and Salet 2003; Terhorst et al. 2004). Crucial to Amsterdam's success is its location within the Dutch welfare state that provides enough material equality to allow the development of other capabilities. This state has proved itself remarkably adaptable, having moved from a corporate Fordist model founded on

the concept of the family wage to an approach oriented much more toward individual circumstances:

Active labour market policies were traditionally oriented toward male heads of households. Female labour force participation rates traditionally lagged far behind male ones ... compared to the US. That changed fairly dramatically over the course of the period under study [mid 1980s–mid-1990s], however, with increasing numbers of Dutch women entering the paid labour force, albeit often on a part-time basis. ... Through its robust wages policy, the social democratic welfare regime of the Netherlands can apparently deliver to people relatively equal pre-government labour incomes, despite the fact that some of them work more hours than others. (Goodin et al 1999, 250)

Brian Barry (2001), in a polemical attack on multiculturalism, contends that its proponents in the United States ignore problems of income inequality that are much more serious than discrimination on the basis of race and gender. Although he is somewhat willfully blind to the interrelationship between racism, sexism, and income inequality, he nevertheless is correct in pressing the point that multiculturalists have little to say on the subject of structural economic inequality. To the extent that left movements focus on issues of identity rather than economics and become diverted by symbolic causes, they do not provide the social force needed to create an economic context within which public policy can address their concerns. In a situation of extreme economic inequality, according privileges to the oppressed simply shuffles around who obtains higher positions in the economic hierarchy; it does not make those positions more broadly available.

At the same time symbols do matter, and people do not live by bread alone. From a planning perspective the opening up of spaces for women and the redesigning of transportation and employment systems to take account of their particular needs is key to both economic improvement and self-esteem. Higher wages and a more redistributive tax system do not deal with such issues as perceptions of exclusion and discrimination, lack of public transportation for suburban women and children, inflexibility of working hours, no paid maternity leave, inadequate daycare, lack of public safety, etc. Essential to the feminist cause are stronger state policies and social norms to reverse the trend toward growing income inequality that has afflicted the United States and the United Kingdom to a much greater extent than the European social democratic nations (Goodin et al. 1999). But, as Nussbaum asserts, also essential are the other policies that allow the attainment of a range of capabilities. An effective political movement aiming at these ends should not overly stress difference and redress of past wrongs but instead must emphasize broadly accepted views of justice. Rawls's conception of the original position in which individuals do not know their ultimate social status assumes all human beings as intrinsically alike and opens him

to the accusations of failing to recognize variations. But nevertheless it is based on an initial expectation of the capacity for empathy, that it is possible for most people to envision what it is like to stand in another's shoes. It is empathy in conformity with universalistic principles that provides the normative basis for the just city rather than a stance based in inherent difference.

Interestingly the Dutch system has long accommodated difference through "pillarization"—an administrative system whereby nongovernmental groups, originally organized according to religious affiliation, implemented social and educational programs. The system reflects the responsiveness possible within a social democratic state but also the issues presented when the "pillars" enforce internal norms of intolerance. In the nineteenth century Catholics and Protestants organized their own schools and social services with state funding; in the last century both secular institutions and Muslim congregations became integrated into the system. The present-day consequence is that Muslims emerge with serious educational deficits in relation to a highly skilled workforce, and Muslim women have great difficulty breaking out of customary norms. The fact, however, that no one is compelled by the state to participate in any religiously based regime means that those Muslims who do not wish to conform to custom can potentially realize their capabilities.

The Amsterdam example shows the possibilities for cities based on universal principles of justice and tolerance. It also shows that planning can indeed work to promote the realization of these principles. Nevertheless the existence of such a model and even its emulation by public officials alone cannot bring it into being elsewhere. Rather, a political movement must be present to provoke public action, and its success depends on widespread acceptance that benefits of social transformation extend beyond a narrow group. Communicative theory and sensitivity to difference only provide an opportunity for conversation. The popular enthusiasm that gave birth to the planning movement and has more recently fostered the new urbanism depended on proposals for desired ends, not just process. Planning, if it is to succeed in improving the lives of women, must have as its goal general improvement in the material situation of everyone who is relatively deprived at the same time as it delineates the particular needs of women. The strength of Martha Nussbaum's capabilities argument is that she understands that capabilities must be combined, that there are universal norms against which achievements can be measured, and that it is not possible to improve the situation of women in isolation from general social betterment, even while the converse is not possible either. An emphasis on the substance of outcomes does not preclude a commitment to democratic principles. Nussbaum, in her listing of capabilities, includes political participation along with other prerequisites for adequate functioning. She insists that capabilities should not be traded off against each other; that all are necessary in order to achieve a just society.

As applied to the profession of urban planning, the capabilities approach requires a simultaneous sensitivity to broad questions of economic growth and equity, to democratic participation, and to application of these norms to women without prior assumptions concerning their "natural" roles but also with attention to the particular social context in which they are functioning.

NOTES

This is an original chapter written for this volume. It is based in part on my article "Planning in a Different Voice," *Planning Theory*, 7/8, 1992, 27–31. Thanks to Robert Beauregard and Lisa Servon for their comments.

1. Often cited is Baudelaire's meditation on two lovers, seated in a recently constructed sidewalk café on one of Haussmann's new boulevards, confronted by a poor family dressed in rags who gaze at them raptly. Interestingly, and contrary to current feminist characterizations of male/female difference, Baudelaire pictures the man feeling compassion toward them, while the woman expresses contempt, even though "their [the family's] fascination carries no hostile undertones" (Berman 1988, 149).

2. Although Marxist socialism also adhered to a rationalist discourse, early Soviet feminists put in place systems to relieve women of household responsibilities. These pioneering efforts, however, soon disappeared.

3. Two strands of reform were particularly important in England and the United States from the latter part of the nineteenth century until the 1950s: advocacy of the neighborhood unit and the organic community, as represented by Ebenezer Howard, Clarence Stein, Henry Wright, and Lewis Mumford; and promotion of housing improvements for the working class, the proponents of which included Catherine Bauer and Frances Perkins.

4. Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, known as "Mr. Conservative," was one of the sponsors of the American postwar public housing program.

5. Rousseau, of course, believed in participatory democracy. The concept of the general will, however, when removed from his context of the small polity in which the participation of everyone is possible, leads to decision making by those in the best position to discern what is best for everyone.

6. Within political theory pluralist thought, tracing back to *The Federalist* No. 10 and de Tocqueville and elaborated after World War II by David Truman, Robert Dahl, V.O. Key, and the pluralist urbanists (Wolfinger, Polsby, etc.), had already problematized the concept of the public interest. These pluralists, nevertheless, assumed an underlying "fundamental agreement" on general principles of democracy, the scope of the political, and individual rights.

7. Of course, working-class women, and especially women of color, always worked. That they did so, however, further reinforced the idea that high status for women meant staying at home.

8. The Wages for Housework movement based its demands on the contribution of women's household labor to economic functioning.

9. In the United States the original impetus for the War on Poverty in the 1960s was the fear of (overwhelmingly male) juvenile delinquency (Marris and Rein 1967).

10. An exception is the work on women's microenterprises. See Servon (1999).

11. *Women and the American City*, edited by Stimpson et al. (1981), is the book version of that journal issue.

12. This debate is further subdivided according to whether gender differences are attributed to biology, culture, or psychological formation through the Oedipal resolution.

13. In line with the argument that feminine consciousness is socially created, it is not necessarily equated with being biologically female.

14. Interestingly one exception is in the evaluation of the desirability of building sports facilities. Here, despite the overwhelming evidence that such structures do not pay for themselves economically, city governments nevertheless expend large sums on them because they allegedly enhance a city's prestige.

15. At a conference held in Toronto in 1997 to honor Jane Jacobs, a panel of economists identified her work as a precursor of public choice theory, the conservative economic doctrine that considers the most desirable social outcomes to emanate from individuals' self-interested choices.

16. Max Weber recognized the harshness of judgments based purely on rationality and noted that substantive justice ("Kadi-justice") cannot simply follow formal rules of administration. But he also contended that sentiment which demands justice "oriented toward some concrete instance and person"—that is, the moral view that Gilligan ascribes to feminine sensibility—is easily manipulated (Weber 1958, 220–221).

17. Chantal Mouffe (1999, 752) contends that Habermas and his followers fail "to acknowledge the dimension of power and antagonism and their ineradicable character. By postulating the availability of [a] public sphere where power and antagonism would have been eliminated and where a rational consensus would have been realized, this model of democratic politics denies the central role in politics of the conflictural dimension and its crucial role in the formation of collective identities."

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PART THREE

Housing